Peter Fasoli*

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Peter is a law clerk in the firm's Energy Regulatory practice. He received his J.D. from The George Washington University Law School, where he was a member of the George Washington Journal on Energy and Environmental Law.

*Not licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction; application pending for admission to the District of Columbia Bar.

On September 24, 2026, FERC denied a complaint filed by Oklo, Inc. (Oklo) against PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) alleging that PJM unlawfully administered the interconnection process to Oklo’s 750-megawatt project (Project) and unjustifiably withdrew the Project from Cycle 01.  In denying the complaint, FERC found that Oklo failed to meet its burden under Federal Power Act (FPA) section 206 by failing to show that PJM violated its Open Access Transmission Tariff (Tariff).

Oklo submitted the Project’s data, signed agreement, and deposit information to PJM for Cycle 01 on April 27, 2026. PJM issued its deficiency notice on May 15, 2026, identifying six deficiencies. Oklo asserted that it timely cured the six deficiencies identified in the notice, and then on June 24, 2026, PJM identified five additional, potential deficiencies, including failure to re-submit a dynamic modeling development guidelines (DMDG) report and checklist when Oklo submitted its cure to the May 15 Deficiency Notice. On August 3, 2026, PJM then withdrew the Project from Cycle 01. On August 4, 2026, Oklo stated that PJM issued a Withdrawal Notice, explaining that the Project was deficient.

On September 10, 2026, FERC approved a new version of a Reliability Standard proposed by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Reliability Standard CIP-014-4 (CIP-014-4) (Physical Security). The original version, CIP-014-1, was approved by Order No. 802 in November 2014. The stated purpose of the currently effective version of the standard is to “identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations (transmission facilities), and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within and Interconnection.”  NERC explained in its petition that the new version of CIP-014 is intended to ensure an adequate and consistent approach for evaluating instability and identifying infrastructure that is critical to the operation of the Bulk Power System.