On November 17, 2016, FERC issued Order No. 831, revising its regulations regarding incremental energy offer caps imposed by Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) and Independent System Operators (“ISOs”). As a result, RTOs and ISOs will be required to cap each resource’s “incremental energy offer”—the portion of an energy resource’s supply market offer that can vary depending on output or demand levels—at the higher of $1,000/megawatt-hour (“MWh”) or that resource’s verified actual or expected cost-based incremental energy offer. RTOs and ISOs must also cap verified cost-based incremental energy offers at $2,000/MWh when calculating locational marginal prices (“LMP”). According to FERC, Order No. 831 will reduce the likelihood that offer caps will suppress LMPs below the marginal cost of production, as well as ensure fair compensation for generators and more efficient resource dispatching from grid operators.

On November 4, 2016, FERC issued an order denying a complaint filed by HORUS Central Valley Solar 1, LLC and HORUS Central Valley Solar 2, LLC (jointly, “HORUS”) against the California Independent System Operator Corporation (“CAISO”). In the complaint, HORUS requested that the Commission prevent CAISO from imposing interconnection procedures and study requirements in addition to those already imposed on HORUS by the Western Area Power Administration (“WAPA”). In denying the complaint, FERC reaffirmed its existing policy that generators must obtain transmission service at or beyond the point where facility ownership changes, as well as beyond the interconnection point with the wider integrated grid. Because HORUS sought to connect to WAPA-owned interconnection facilities, and those facilities in turn interconnected with CAISO, HORUS was required to comply with both WAPA’s and CAISO’s interconnection procedures.

On November 8, 2016, FERC approved the California Independent System Operator Corporation’s (“CAISO”) proposed tariff revisions intended to improve the effectiveness of its local market power mitigation procedures by reducing the frequency of instances where such procedures under-predict congestion. Going forward, CAISO will apply mitigation measures at real-time dispatch intervals.

On October 31, 2016, FERC approved PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (“PJM”) proposed revisions to Schedule 1 of the PJM Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (“Operating Agreement”) and the parallel provisions of Attachment K-Appendix of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”). The approved revisions modify PJM’s compensation procedures for load reductions during emergency conditions.

On October 28, 2016, FERC issued an order that both partially accepted compliance filings and also denied rehearing requests from PJM Interconnection, LLC (“PJM”), Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (“MISO”) and MISO Transmission Owners regarding Order No. 1000 interregional compliance filings. Of particular concern for the Commission was the parties’ MISO-PJM Joint Operating Agreement (“MISO-PJM JOA”), and whether it failed to satisfy certain required Interregional Cost Allocation Principles. This is the third such order to address the parties’ compliance with the interregional transmission coordination and cost allocation requirements of Order No. 1000.

On September 30, 2016, FERC granted a Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (“SPP”) petition for waiver of certain provisions of the SPP Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”) in order to provide the option of a payment plan to entities affected by SPP’s delayed implementation of a revenue crediting process for transmission upgrades.

On September 8, 2016, the Commission denied a complaint filed by Boundless Energy NE, LLC, CityGreen Transmission, Inc. and Miller Bros. (collectively, “Competitive Transmission Developers” or “CTD”) against the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”), alleging that NYISO violated its Open Access Transmission Tariff (“OATT”) in its most-recent solicitation for projects to address public policy transmission needs identified by the New York State Public Service Commission (“NYPSC”). The Commission determined that CTD had failed to demonstrate that NYISO had violated its OATT, or that NYISO had improperly abdicated its responsibilities to the NYPSC in the implementation of its public policy transmission planning process.