On May 21, 2020, FERC issued a proposed policy statement setting forth a revised approach to addressing requests for waiver, including: waiver of rates; non-rate terms and conditions; market rules; and procedural deadlines that are set forth in tariffs, rate schedules, service agreements, and contracts on file with FERC (“Proposed Policy Statement”). FERC specifically proposes to:

  1. discontinue granting retroactive waivers of tariff provisions, with a few specified exceptions; and
  2. grant requests for “remedial relief” only when applicants demonstrate that (a) such a request does not violate the filed rate doctrine or rule against retroactive ratemaking, or (b) the requested relief is within FERC’s remedial authority under section 309 of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) or section 16 of the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”).

On May 21, 2020, FERC found PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (“PJM”) existing reserve market design to be unjust and unreasonable and established a replacement market design that includes, among other elements, a downward-sloping Operating Reserve Demand Curve (“ORCD”) and a $2,000/MWh price ceiling. In addition, FERC found that the changes to PJM’s reserve market would render PJM’s existing methodology for calculating its energy and ancillary services offset (“E&AS Offset”) unjust and unreasonable, and directed PJM to implement a forward-looking E&AS Offset on compliance. In a separate dissenting statement, Commissioner Richard Glick stated that PJM’s proposal would result in over procurement of reserves and impose billions of dollars of additional costs on consumers. Pointing to FERC’s recent orders accepting PJM’s Variable Resource Requirement Curve (see April 23, 2020 edition of the WER) and Minimum Offer Price Rule (see April 22, 2020 edition of the WER), Commissioner Glick characterized the May 21 order as the latest installment in a series of decisions prioritizing high prices over efficient markets.

On May 21, 2020, FERC issued Opinion No. 569-A, which revised the Commission’s methodology for determining whether an established rate of return on equity (“ROE”) is just and reasonable under section 206 of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”). Among other things, Opinion No. 569-A accepts the use of a third financial model for establishing just and reasonable ROE for Transmission Owners (“TOs”)—the “Risk Premium Model” (which was rejected in an earlier opinion)—in addition to the previously accepted two-step discount cash flow (“DCF”) model and capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”). Commissioner Richard Glick dissented in part, arguing that FERC was “once again changing course and revamping [its] ROE methodology” to the detriment of regulatory certainty among TOs and investors. In a related action, FERC contemporaneously issued a Policy Statement clarifying that the newly revised ROE methodology in Opinion No. 569-A applies to natural gas and oil pipelines, with certain exceptions.

On May 1, 2020, the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) to update its National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) implementing regulations concerning applications to import to, or export from, liquid natural gas (“LNG”) terminals. In particular, DOE has previously determined that the transportation of natural gas by marine vessels normally does not pose the potential for significant environmental impacts, and accordingly, exports of LNG should be considered a “categorical exclusion” from NEPA review.  Comments are due June 1, 2020. 

On May 12, 2020, FERC clarified that the offer floor price calculation for Special Case Resources (“SCRs”)—demand response resources participating in the New York Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (“NYISO”) Installed Capacity market (“ICAP”)—must include any payment or other benefit provided by state-sponsored programs. FERC’s order follows a February 2020 order directing NYISO to apply its buyer-side mitigation (“BSM”) rules to all new SCRs, and finding that the offer floor calculation for SCRs should include only the incremental costs of providing wholesale-level capacity services rather than payments from retail-level demand response programs designed to address distribution-level reliability needs. Commissioner Richard Glick issued a separate statement concurring with FERC’s clarification as to the SCR offer floor price calculation, but added that NYISO’s BSM regime will impose arbitrarily high offer floors on SCRs that are not exercising market power.

Due to the unprecedented and rapidly changing landscape caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, FERC has provided multiple resources and notices over the last two weeks. Three of those relevant releases include an Epidemic/Pandemic Response Plan Resource, a policy statement providing guidance to oil pipelines impacted by the pandemic, and a notice that FERC is temporarily delaying the processing of all hardcopy submissions.

On May 1, 2020, FERC accepted two agreements—an unexecuted Network Integration Transmission Service Agreement (“NITSA”) and a Network Operating Agreement (“NOA”) (together, “Agreements”)—filed by Southwest Power Pool Inc. (“SPP”) to be effective February 1, 2020, subject to the outcome of pending rehearing proceedings. Consistent with FERC’s prior notice policies, SPP had requested waiver of the 60-day prior notice requirement to permit the Agreements to become effective February 1, 2020. While Commissioner Danly concurred with the decision to grant an effective date prior to the filing date, he noted that this practice appears to run afoul of the rule against retroactive ratemaking and urged FERC to reexamine its practice.

On April 30, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (“Eighth Circuit”) denied Nebraska Public Power District’s (“NPPD”) petition for review of FERC’s approval of the Southwest Power Pool, Inc.’s (“SPP”) placement of Tri-State Generation & Transmission Association’s (“Tri-State”) transmission facilities in SPP Zone 17. NPPD challenged FERC’s approval on cost causation grounds, arguing that FERC’s ruling was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to find that the benefits accruing to NPPD are roughly commensurate with the costs. The Eighth Circuit denied NPPD’s petition, concluding that FERC provided plausible and articulable reasons for why the costs and benefits of placing Tri-State’s transmission facilities in Zone 17 were comparable, and that FERC’s cost-causation analysis was not arbitrary and capricious.

On April 30, 2020, FERC granted Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C.’s (“Tennessee Gas”) petition for declaratory order that requested authorization to charge market-based rates for its proposed firm flexible storage (“FS Flex”) service. In reaching its decision, FERC reviewed whether Tennessee Gas held significant market power in the relevant product and geographic markets where the FS Flex service was to be offered, with the geographic market including east Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama (“Gulf Coast Production Area”). FERC found that Tennessee Gas’s small market share and market concentration in the relevant markets adequately demonstrated that Tennessee Gas lacked market power and that there were no other factors indicating that Tennessee Gas would be able to exercise market power when providing the FS Flex service.

On May 4, 2020, FERC released an interview with its Pandemic Liaison Caroline Wozniak as its second coronavirus podcast. Ms. Wozniak provided insight into her role in FERC’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and explained that the pandemic liaison is intended to serve as a single point of contact for…