On March 20, 2020, FERC issued an order accepting PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (“PJM”) proposal as part of its Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (“RTEP”) to allow project developers to submit binding cost commitments on a voluntary basis, and to undertake a comparative review and analysis of these commitments in selecting transmission projects. FERC accepted PJM’s proposal over the objections of certain PJM transmission owners, and concluded that the proposal would assist PJM in selecting the most efficient and cost-effective transmission solutions in its RTEP while providing greater transparency into PJM’s evaluation process.

On March 20, 2020, FERC denied rehearing of a February 2018 order accepting the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (“MISO”) resource adequacy Tariff provisions (see March 5, 2018 edition of the WER). FERC noted that many of the arguments raised on rehearing sought to impose on MISO the rules and requirements used in the centralized capacity markets in the eastern Regional Transmission Organizations/Independent System Operators (“RTOs/ISOs”). FERC rejected those arguments, concluding that unlike the centralized capacity constructs used in the eastern RTOs/ISOs, MISO’s capacity auction is not, and never has been, the primary mechanism for Load-Serving Entities (“LSEs”) to procure capacity.

On March 19, 2020, FERC authorized Jordan Cove Energy Project L.P.’s (“Jordan Cove”) Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) section 3 proposal to site, construct, and operate a liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) export terminal in Coos County, Oregon (“Terminal”) and Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline, LP’s (“Pacific Connector”) application under section 7(c) of the NGA and Parts 157 and 284 of FERC’s regulations that would allow it to construct and operate an interstate natural gas pipeline system connected to the Terminal (“Pacific Connector Pipeline”). The decision prompted a dissent from Commissioner Richard Glick, who argued that the majority’s decision did not adequately consider the impacts that the Terminal and Pacific Connector Pipeline will have on climate change and other environmental concerns.

On March 17, 2020, FERC accepted revisions to the PJM Interconnection LLC (“PJM”) Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”) to establish enhanced procedures for compliance with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) reliability standard CIP-024-2.  A majority of FERC Commissioners found that the Tariff revisions, captured in a new proposed Tariff Attachment M-4, appropriately balanced transparency obligations in transmission planning with the need to maintain strict confidentiality regarding the names, locations, and vulnerabilities of CIP-014-2 facilities.  In a separate opinion, Commissioner Glick dissented, in part, arguing that the proposal inappropriately categorized Attachment M-4 projects as a subset of “Supplemental Projects” under the Tariff and PJM Operating Agreement. Commissioner Glick argued that the proposal improperly subjected such projects to non-regional cost allocation, contrary to cost-causation and other transmission planning principles expressed in Commission Order Nos. 890 and 1000.

On February 20, 2020, FERC staff issued a letter to the licensee for the FERC-licensed Anderson Dam Project (“Project”), directing the licensee to immediately initiate a full drawdown of the Project’s reservoir by October 1, 2020. The Project is located south of San Francisco and serves as an important water supply resource, but has long been identified as vulnerable to flooding and seismic events that could result in the catastrophic spilling of floodwaters into Silicon Valley.  As such, the licensee has been operating the Project at a restricted reservoir level (as low as 58% of capacity in 2020) to mitigate flooding and seismic risks.

I. Summary of NOPR

On March 19, 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) proposing to revise its electric transmission incentive policy under Federal Power Act (FPA) Section 219[1] “to stimulate the development of transmission infrastructure needed to support the nation’s evolving generation resource mix, technological innovation and shifts in load patterns.”[2] FERC’s NOPR includes a number of changes to its transmission incentives policy and seeks comment from industry participants.

FERC’s NOPR proposes to shift the focus in granting transmission incentives from an approach based on the risks and challenges faced by a project to an approach based on economic and reliability benefits to consumers.

The NOPR intends to replace the current policy of limiting incentives to the base rate of return on equity (ROE) zone of reasonableness with a 250-basis-point cap on total ROE incentives. The NOPR proposes that transmission providers should be allowed to seek removal of the ROE zone-of-reasonableness restrictions placed on previously-granted incentives and to replace them with the hard cap.

FERC proposes to increase the ROE incentive for joining and remaining a member of a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO), an Independent System Operator (ISO) or other Commission-approved transmission organization (collectively hereinafter, “RTO”) from 50 basis points to 100 basis points, and to make the incentive available regardless of whether such participation is voluntary.

The NOPR also offers a 50-basis-point ROE incentive for transmission projects that meet a pre-construction benefit-to-cost ratio in the top 25 percent of projects examined over a sample period, and an additional 50 basis points for projects that meet a post-construction benefit-to-cost ratio in the top 10 percent of projects studied over the same sample period.

FERC further proposes a 100-basis-point ROE incentive for transmission technologies that enhance reliability, efficiency and capacity, as well as improve the operation of new or existing transmission facilities. The NOPR also proposes an incentive of up to 50 basis points for projects that demonstrate reliability benefits by providing a quantitative analysis, where possible, or a qualitative analysis.

Finally, FERC plans to retain several existing non-ROE incentives, including those related to Construction Work In Progress (CWIP), hypothetical capital structure, accelerated depreciation for rate recovery, and regulatory asset treatment, that remain vital in removing regulatory barriers and other impediments to transmission investment.

Commissioner Richard Glick dissented in part from the NOPR.

The NOPR seeks comment on these proposed reforms 90 days from the date of its publication in the Federal Register.

On March 19, 2020, FERC granted Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (“PG&E”), licensee for the Kilarc-Cow Creek Hydroelectric, Project No. 606 (“Project”), request for a Declaratory Order finding that the California State Water Resources Control Board (“California Board”) waived its authority to issue a water quality certification under section 401 of the Clean Water Act.  FERC’s recent opinion continues its application of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Hoopa Valley Tribe (see December 11, 2019 edition of the WER), which held that section 401 provides one year as the absolute maximum for a state to act on a water quality certification application and rejected an extension of the statutory deadline via a coordinated withdrawal-and-resubmission scheme between an applicant and the state certifying agency.

On Thursday, March 19, in lieu of its monthly Commission meeting, FERC issued a Notice regarding its response to the Novel Coronavirus Disease (“COVID-19”) and the President’s March 13 declaration of a National Emergency.  Chairman Neil Chatterjee delivered comments about the Notice and the Commission’s operations in the coming weeks and months.

On March 10, 2020, FERC granted rehearing of its November 9, 2018 order that accepted revisions to ISO New England Inc.’s (“ISO-NE”) Tariff modifying the calculation of the economic life of existing capacity resources seeking to retire or permanently leave the ISO-NE capacity market, to better reflect competitive market behavior. FERC determined the benefits of the Tariff revisions did not outweigh the disruption to capacity market participants’ settled expectations and, therefore rejected the economic life revisions in their entirety, effective August 10, 2018, and declined to rerun any Forward Capacity Auctions (“FCA”) to preserve market certainty.