On September 19, 2019, one Independent and four Democratic U.S. Senators wrote a letter to FERC asking for an explanation of three actions the Senators believed showed an “apparent erosion” of the “vital role” FERC plays in preventing fraud and manipulation in U.S. energy markets and financial markets: (1) the decline in FERC-initiated civil penalty actions and the abrupt termination of non-public investigations without explanation; (2) the elimination of the Division of Energy Market Oversight (“DEMO”); and (3) the rescission of its policy on issuing Notices of Alleged Violations (“NAVs”) for investigations. Those Senators were Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Edward Markey (D-MA), and Angus King (I-ME).

On September 16, 2019, FERC accepted revisions to the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) tariff that: (1) establish a process by which existing capacity sellers can request removal of their capacity resource’s status; and (2) revise the process for must-offer exceptions due to an existing seller’s physical inability to meet its capacity requirements. The changes clarify how existing capacity resources may, under certain circumstances, effectively elect to “opt out” of PJM’s annual capacity auctions (termed Based Residual Auctions, or “BRAs”).

On September 19, 2019, FERC granted a petition for declaratory order by the New England Ratepayers Association (“New England Ratepayers”), which asked FERC to find that a New Hampshire statute, Senate Bill 365 (“SB 365”), mandating a purchase price for wholesale sales of certain biomass and waste generators in the state, is preempted by the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) and violates section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”).

On September 25, 2019, FERC issued a notice stating that the results of the ISO New England, Inc. (“ISO-NE”) thirteenth Forward Capacity Auction (“FCA”) went into effect as of June 28, 2019 by operation of law—i .e., without FERC action. FCA 13 went into effect by operation of law due to a lack of quorum in the proceeding in which ISO-NE submitted the auction results and requested FERC approval of the auction as being conducted in accordance with ISO-NE’s Tariff and producing just and reasonable rates. Under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, FERC has 60 days to act on a proposed rate filing; if FERC takes no action in that 60-day period—a very rare occurrence—then the rate becomes effective automatically. On September 27, 2019, Commissioner Richard Glick issued a statement indicating that he did not participate in the proceeding due to an ethics pledge that precludes him from working on any matters in which his former employer, Avangrid Inc., or any of its affiliates or subsidiaries is a party until November 29, 2019. Commissioner Glick explained that he could not participate because Vineyard Wind LLC, a joint venture between Avangrid Renewables, LLC and Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, was a party to the proceeding.

On September 20, 2019, FERC issued an original license to McMahan Hydroelectric, LLC (“McMahan”) for the 600-kilowatt Bynum Hydroelectric Project, located on the Haw River in Chatham County, North Carolina. In its licensing order, FERC held that North Carolina waived authority under section 401 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) by failing to act within one year of receiving McMahan’s request for water quality certification under section 401. In a separate statement, Commissioner Glick—while agreeing with the conclusion that North Carolina had waived section 401 authority—dissented in the Commission’s rationale for finding waiver.

On September 18, 2019, the First Circuit Court of Appeals (“First Circuit”) affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts’s (“District Court”) ruling that dismissed twelve New England retail electricity customers’ (“Plaintiffs”) federal antitrust and state-law claims against Eversource Energy and Avangrid, Inc (“Defendants”).  Initially, Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in District Court, claiming Defendants violated section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, as well as various state antitrust and consumer-protection laws (see December 12, 2017 edition of the WER).  The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims, finding that they were barred by the filed-rate doctrine and, alternatively, that the Plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing and failed to plausibly allege a monopolization claim under the Sherman Act.  On review, the First Circuit agreed with the District Court that the filed-rate doctrine barred Plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims.  Accordingly, the First Circuit found no need to reach the District Court’s alternative grounds for dismissal and dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal and state claims pursuant to the filed-rate doctrine.

On September 19, 2019, FERC proposed substantial revisions to its Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”) regulations.  If adopted, the package of reforms proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) would: (1) allow states more flexibility to incorporate competitive forces when setting avoided cost rates for Qualifying Facilities (“QFs”), (2) modify the “one-mile rule,” (3) reduce the size threshold for the rebuttable presumption about QFs’ ability to access markets, (4) provide clarity on establishing a legally enforceable obligation (“LEO”), and (5) establish a simplified process to challenge a project’s QF status.  FERC requested comments on a number of proposals, which are due 60 days from publication of the NOPR in the Federal Register.

On September 19, 2019, FERC concurrently issued two orders granting in part separate complaints filed by American Electric Power Service Corporation (“AEP”) and the City of Prescott, Arkansas (“Prescott”) finding that, to the extent loads pseudo-tied from Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (“MISO”) to Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (“SPP”) are subject to overlapping or duplicative congestion charges by both MISO and SPP, then such charges are unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.  On the same day, FERC also established briefing procedures (“Briefing Order”) related to the complaint orders to further investigate issues concerning potentially unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory tariff provisions, contract provisions, and/or practices that result in overlapping and/or duplicative congestion charges being imposed on pseudo-tie transactions between MISO and SPP.

On September 19, 2019, FERC granted in part and denied in part a complaint by EDF Renewable Energy, Inc. (“EDF”) which alleged that the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (“MISO”), Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (“SPP”), and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) Open Access Transmission Tariffs (“Tariffs”), the MISO-SPP Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”), and the MISO-PJM JOA are unjust and unreasonable because they lack sufficient detail and transparency regarding the process each Regional Transmission Organization (“RTO”) uses to coordinate with Affected Systems, i.e., other transmission systems that may be affected by a proposed generator interconnection.  FERC’s order comes after an April 2018 technical conference that explored the issues raised in EDF’s complaint as well as broader Affected Systems issues (see February 13, 2018 edition of the WER).  FERC’s September 19 order agreed that the lack of transparency in Affected System coordination creates cost uncertainty that presents a significant obstacle to the development of new generation resources, and required MISO, SPP, and PJM to memorialize their current Affected System study coordination processes in their Tariffs and JOAs.  FERC also required the RTOs to add to their Tariffs and JOAs clear references to further Affected System coordination details in business practices and other coordination documents.  However, FERC declined to initiate a generic proceeding on the Affected Systems coordination issues raised in the technical conference in regions beyond those identified in the complaint.

Summary of NOPR

On September 19, 2019, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) proposing to revise its regulations implementing Sections 201 and 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) in light of changes in the energy industry since 1978.[1]