On April 19, 2018, FERC issued a final rule (“Order No. 845”) revising its pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (“LGIP”) and the pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement (“LGIA”) to address reforms of generator interconnection procedures and agreements for generators of more than 20 megawatts.  FERC adopted a majority of the reforms proposed in FERC’s December 15, 2016 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”).

On April 19, 2018, FERC issued a Notice of Inquiry (“NOI”) seeking information regarding whether—and if so, how—to revise its policy for determining if a proposed natural gas pipeline is in the public convenience and necessity.  Specifically, the NOI requests information in four areas related to FERC’s policy for reviewing such certificate applications: (1) determining need for a pipeline project; (2) eminent domain issues; (3) evaluating environmental impacts, including greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and climate change; and (4) changes that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of FERC’s review.

On April 9, 2018, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) filed two alternative proposals to address supply-side state subsidies that, as PJM argues, could otherwise depress prices in PJM’s capacity market, the Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”).  As presented by PJM, its “Capacity Repricing” proposal would establish a two-stage capacity market to accommodate subsidized resources, while the other proposal, the “MOPR-Ex proposal,” would expand PJM’s use of the Minimum Offer Price Rule (“MOPR”) to address subsidized resource entry.  With PJM’s filing, the issue of how to address out-of-market capacity market subsidies returns again to FERC exactly one month after a divided Commission approved a similar filing from the ISO New England Inc. (“ISO-NE”) (see March 20, 2018 edition of the WER).

On April 10, 2018, FERC approved a Stipulation and Consent Agreement (“Settlement”) among the Office of Enforcement (“OE”), ETRACOM LLC (“ETRACOM”), and Michael Rosenberg (together, with ETRACOM, “Respondents”) as in the public interest.  OE claimed that Respondents violated federal law and FERC’s rules against anti-manipulation in the California Independent System Operator Corp. (“CAISO”) wholesale electric market.  FERC determined that the Settlement was fair and reasonable and resolved all outstanding claims and proceedings between OE and the Respondents.

On April 10, 2018, FERC approved the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (“MISO”) proposed revisions to Attachment X of its Open Access Transmission, Energy and Operating Reserve Markets Tariff (“Tariff”).  Specifically, MISO proposed to require interconnection customers seeking to modify their elected level of Network Resource Interconnection Service (“NRIS”), to do so earlier on in the generator interconnection process.

On March 30, 2018, FERC rejected PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (“PJM”) October 17, 2017 proposed tariff revisions to improve the performance of the PJM frequency regulation (“Regulation”) market (the “Regulation Proposal”).  According to PJM, the revisions were needed in light of a number of ongoing operational and market issues that had developed in the Regulation market.  FERC rejected the Regulation Proposal because it did not comply with the requirements of Order No. 755 and FERC’s regulations to compensate all Regulation resources based on the actual quantity of Regulation service provided.

On March 30, 2018, FERC issued an order establishing a technical conference and partially granting one of two complaints against various changes to the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) frequency regulation market.  In partially granting one complaint, FERC found that PJM’s tariff is unjust and unreasonable in so far as it omits the methodology for calculating certain regulation-related cost curves, as well as the parameters governing certain regulation market signals.  In the forthcoming technical conference, FERC intends to consider both: (1) whether PJM’s recent frequency regulation market changes hamper the full participation of storage resources, for example, to provide regulation services, and (2) whether PJM’s regulation market design as a whole is consistent with prior FERC precedent.

On April 2, 2018, FERC denied a complaint alleging that the interconnection process under Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (“MISO”) tariff was unjust and unreasonable because certain wind generators were experiencing delays in the process, such that those customers would not receive a Generator Interconnection Agreement (“GIA”) in time to receive Federal Production Tax Credit (“PTC”) benefits.  In doing so, FERC found that there was no evidence that MISO was not making reasonable efforts to meet interconnection deadlines, as required by its tariff.  FERC added that prior precedent does not require MISO to ensure wind generators receive their GIA in time to receive full PTC benefits.

On April 3, 2018, FERC pre-approved numerous utilities’ request to enter into certain future transmission system related transactions in the event of a catastrophic grid reliability event (“Triggering Event”).  As a result, participant-utilities in the Regional Equipment Sharing for Transmission Outage Restoration Agreement (“RESTORE Agreement”) are eligible to purchase certain replacement transmission system equipment (the “Proposed Transactions”) from other participant-utilities if there is a Triggering Event that impacts transmission service capabilities.  In addition, FERC also granted the utility-applicants’ (“Applicants’”) request for waiver of certain affiliate purchase restrictions in the event that qualifying transactions between affiliates becomes necessary.

On March 28, 2018, FERC partially accepted the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (“MISO”) Order No. 831 compliance filing (“March 28 Order”).  In Order Nos. 831 and 831-A, FERC required Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) and Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) to amend their respective tariff provisions governing existing offer caps on incremental energy offers, which FERC determined was necessary to: (1) avoid suppressing Locational Marginal Prices (“LMPs”) below the marginal cost of production; and (2) fully compensate generation resources for the costs incurred to serve load (see November 21, 2016 edition of the WER).