On January 2, 2018, the California Independent System Operator Corp. (“CAISO”) announced plans to become its own reliability coordinator by spring 2019.  The plan will require CAISO to withdraw from Peak Reliability, the current reliability coordinator for the Western Interconnection. Although the full suite of reliability services to be offered remains unclear, CAISO stated that it will offer outage coordination, day-ahead planning, and real-time monitoring reliability services.

On December 21, 2017, FERC accepted the Southwest Power Pool, Inc.’s (“SPP”) proposed tariff revisions related to its Integrated Transmission Planning (“ITP”) process contained in SPP’s Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”).  In 2015, SPP created the Transmission Planning Improvement Task Force (“Task Force”) to review its transmission planning process to determine if improvements were needed.  Based on the Task Force’s recommendations, SPP proposed to revise certain language in its Tariff, including moving from a three-year transmission planning cycle to a one-year cycle.

On December 21, 2017, FERC Chairman Kevin McIntyre unexpectedly announced at his first Commission meeting that FERC will conduct a review of its 1999 Policy Statement on Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities (“1999 Policy Statement”).  In doing so, Chairman McIntyre recognized that “[m]uch has changed in the energy world since 1999, and it is incumbent upon [the Commission] to take another look at the way in which we assess the value and viability of our pipeline applications.”  According to multiple reports, Chairman McIntyre clarified that he does not believe that the review will affect current pending pipeline applications.  Furthermore, Chairman McIntyre indicated that the review of the 1999 Policy Statement, which governs how FERC evaluates proposals for certificating new gas pipeline construction, will take place sometime in 2018. 

On December 21, 2017, FERC issued an order accepting a proposal from the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (“MISO”) to revise its Open Access Transmission, Energy, and Operating Reserve Markets Tariff (“Tariff”) and establish Dynamic Narrow Constrained Areas (“Dynamic NCAs”).  FERC found that MISO’s proposal would strengthen existing market power mitigation measures in MISO and help ensure that the potential exercise of market power during such transitory conditions would be properly mitigated.

On December 11, 2017, Eversource Energy (“Eversource”) sent a cease and desist letter to Fred Krupp, President of the Environmental Defense Fund (“EDF”) and N. Jonathan Peress, EDF’s Senior Director of Energy Market Policy.  Specifically, Eversource directed both EDF executives to immediately stop the publication of all statements insinuating that Eversource has withheld gas pipeline capacity from the wholesale electricity market in order to earn profits from higher prices.

On December 11, 2017, BP America Inc., BP Corporation North America Inc., BP America Production Company, and BP Energy Company (collectively, “BP”) requested FERC to dismiss its July 11, 2016 order (“July 11 Order”) assessing civil penalties against BP and requiring BP to disgorge profits for violating FERC’s anti-market manipulation rule.  In doing so, BP argued that, due to recent federal court cases, the law had changed regarding the statute of limitations for actions imposing civil penalties and disgorgement.  Therefore, according to BP, FERC’s August 5, 2013 order to show cause issued to BP failed to commence a “proceeding” within the meaning of the statute of limitations for enforcing civil fines and penalties, and thus FERC’s assessment of civil penalties and disgorgement was time-barred.  Rather, BP argued that the statute of limitations began to run on November 25, 2008 at the latest, and thus FERC was required to commence a “proceeding” by November 25, 2013, but FERC did not commence a “proceeding” until May 15, 2014 at the earliest when it set the matter for hearing.

On December 8, 2017, FERC issued an order on remand, rejecting PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (“PJM”) proposed revisions to the minimum offer price rule (“MOPR”) in its entirety, reinstating PJM’s prior FERC-approved market design.  FERC further determined that it would not require PJM to rerun the markets for the period in which the now defunct MOPR rules were in operation, as doing so would be burdensome and significantly disrupt the market. 

On December 7, 2017, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report summarizing its review of FERC’s oversight of the nation’s four regional capacity markets.  The GAO found generally that “FERC has not fully assessed the overall performance of capacity markets,” and the agency recommends that FERC improve data quality, use consistent metrics reported through standardized definitions, and establish goals, performance metrics, and risk tolerance levels for capacity markets.  The report comes at a time when FERC is considering significant capacity market-related issues, including the Department of Energy-initiated “Grid Reliability and Resilience Pricing” docket (see October 2, 2017 Edition of the WER), and reliability-focused pricing reforms from the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (see November 21, 2017 edition of the WER).

On November 16, 2017, twelve New England electricity consumers (“Plaintiffs”) filed a class action lawsuit in in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts against two large New England energy companies, Eversource Energy (“Eversource”) and Avangrid, Inc. (“Avangrid”), arguing that they raised power prices by artificially constraining capacity on the Algonquin Gas Transmission Pipeline (“Algonquin”).  Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that for the past three years, Eversource and Avangrid have increased power prices by 20% by reserving more capacity than was needed on Algonquin with the intent to cancel the reservation when it was too late for the pipeline capacity to be resold to other market participants.  Plaintiffs allege that this behavior was a misuse of Eversource’s and Avangrid’s market power, in violation of state and federal unjust enrichment, consumer protection and antitrust laws.