On September 29, 2020, in response to a request for rehearing, FERC issued an order modifying the discussion in, while sustaining the result of, a prior order finding that PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) was not in compliance with three of the five criteria of Order No. 1000’s immediate need reliability project exemption (“Immediate Need Exemption”). Concurrently, in a separate order, FERC modified, while sustaining the result of, an order where it found that ISO New England Inc.’s (“ISO-NE”) implementation of the Immediate Need Exemption was not unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory or preferential.

On September 30, 2020, FERC accepted the California Independent System Operator Corporation’s (“CAISO”) proposals to: 1) permit electric vehicle charging stations to participate in CAISO’s demand response program separately from their host facilities (“EV Proposal”); and 2) incentivize behind-the-meter energy storage in CAISO’s demand response programs to “load shift” by consuming energy during over supply conditions and returning that energy to the system during times of need (“Load Shifting Proposal”). FERC held that CAISO’s proposals would enhance its demand response programs, which compensate load, storage, and generation resources for curtailing their demand in response to CAISO’s instructions. FERC also found that the proposals would ensure that CAISO’s policies keep pace with rapidly evolving electric vehicle and behind-the-meter storage technologies, and would permit these resources to participate in the CAISO market under rules that capture their unique characteristics and benefits.

On September 23, 2020, staff from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) and FERC (collectively, “Joint Staff”) issued a second joint white paper that reversed previous recommendations regarding publicly disclosing the identities of entities accused of Critical Infrastructure Protection (“CIP”) violations. As stated in the Second Joint Whitepaper, the previous recommendation to publicly disclose CIP violator names and other information raised “substantial risks to the security of the Bulk-Power System.” Accordingly, the Second Joint Whitepaper stated that from now on, NERC will request that CIP noncompliance filings be treated as Critical Energy/Electric Infrastructure Information (“CEII”). FERC Staff will also designate such filings as CEII in their entirety.  Additionally, because of the risk associated with the disclosure of CIP noncompliance information, NERC will no longer publicly post redacted versions of CIP noncompliance filings and submittals.

On September 17, 2020, FERC addressed the American Wind Energy Association’s (“AWEA”) request for rehearing of a December 2019 order finding that Generator Interconnection Agreements (“GIAs”), Facilities Construction Agreements (“FCAs”) and Multi-Party Facilities Construction Agreements (“MPFCAs”) entered into between June 24, 2015 and August 31, 2018 (“the interim period”) should be revised to allow Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (“MISO”) transmission owners and affected system operators to unilaterally elect to provide the initial funding for interconnection-related network upgrades. FERC’s September 17 order modified the discussion in the December 2019 order but continued to reach the same result. The order also accepted MISO’s proposed tariff sheets allowing transmission owners and affected system operators to elect transmission owner initial funding for network upgrades for GIAs, FCAs, and MPFCAs that became effective during the interim period. Commissioner Richard Glick issued a dissenting opinion in which he concluded that FERC’s order failed to meaningfully address concerns of undue discrimination and ignored evidence that allowing transmission owners and affected system operators to retroactively elect to self-fund network upgrades would result in substantial harm to interconnection customers and could lead to project terminations.

On September 17, 2020, at FERC’s Virtual Open Meeting, FERC Staff presented an overview of changes to its rehearing practices following the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s (“D.C. Circuit”) recent decision in Allegheny Defense Project v. FERC, 963 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“Allegheny”), which rejected FERC’s practice of issuing “tolling orders” to grant itself more time to consider requests for rehearing (see July 1, 2020 issue of the WER). Staff explained that the changes to FERC’s rehearing practices are intended to allow appeals of FERC orders to proceed in a timely manner and on a complete administrative record. While the D.C. Circuit granted FERC’s motion to stay the court’s mandate in July (see July 29, 2020 edition of the WER), Staff explained in response to questions from FERC Chairman Neil Chatterjee that Staff expects the D.C. Circuit to issue its mandate in early October.

On September 17, 2020, FERC issued a final rule (“Order No. 2222”) amending its regulations to require Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators (“RTO/ISO”) to revise their tariffs to facilitate the participation of distributed energy resource (“DER”) aggregations in organized wholesale electric markets. In the order, FERC found current RTO/ISO DER aggregation market rules to be unjust and unreasonable, established new definitions for DERs and DER aggregations, and detailed RTO/ISO tariff revisions that will allow DER aggregations to participate in RTO/ISO markets. Commissioner Danly dissented from the order, contending that FERC was overextending its jurisdictional authority and that, through the order, FERC was imprudently encouraging “resource development by fiat.” RTO/ISOs are required to file the tariff changes needed to comply with Order No. 2222 within two hundred seventy (270) days of publication of the order in the Federal Register.

On September 17, 2020, FERC issued a Notice of Inquiry (“NOI”) seeking comments on strategies to mitigate any potential risks to the bulk electric system posed by telecommunications equipment and services produced or provided by entities identified as risks to national security. Huawei Technologies Company (“Huawei”) and ZTE Corporation (“ZTE”) have been identified as examples of such entities because they provide communication systems and other equipment and services that are critical to bulk electric system reliability.

On September 16, 2020, the United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (“Committee”) held a hearing to consider Allison Clements’ and Mark C. Christies’ pending FERC nominations as FERC Commissioners. Ms. Clements is slated to join the Commission for a term expiring June 24, 2024, and Mr. Christie is set to join for a term expiring June 30, 2025.

On September 9, 2020, FERC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) proposing updated regulations that will establish a one-year period for state agencies or other certifying authorities (“Certifying Agencies”) to act on requests for water quality certifications related to sections 3 and 7 of the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). Under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), should a Certifying Agency fail to act on such a request within one year, they are deemed to have waived the certification requirements.

On September 4, 2020, FERC rejected the New York Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (“NYISO”) proposed revisions to its buyer-side mitigation (“BSM”) rules that sought to prioritize storage, wind, solar, and other zero-emitting resources (“Public Policy Resources”) in NYISO’s Installed Capacity (“ICAP”) Market, rather than prioritizing new resources purely on a least-cost basis. While NYISO argued the state’s carbon and nitrogen oxide emissions reduction goals mean that a resource’s cost structure is no longer the best predictor of whether it will ultimately be developed, FERC held that NYISO’s proposal was unduly discriminatory because it prioritized Public Policy Resources over other non-Public Policy Resources. The decision sparked a dissent from Commissioner Richard Glick, who characterized FERC’s order as appearing to stake out the “radical” position that it is improper for NYISO to design its Tariff in a way that acknowledges state public policies, and a departure from FERC precedent focused on balancing the effects of state policies with measures to address how those policies affect capacity market prices.